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1Introductory
1. It may be useful to summarise, in advance, my central argument. Firms do not exist, as
has been claimed, because of the cost of using the price mechanism, but because they make
it possible for a complex set of  actions to be carried out concurrently and in conformity
with a particular design. The nature of this concurrent coordination, which is necessary for
the production of goods, is such that it can never come about spontaneously as an
unintended consequence of market transactions. It requires the organisation and planning
that firms typically provide. These firms, which internally provide concurrent coordination,
also buy and sell on competitive markets, and the indirect consequence of their transactions
is to bring about a spontaneous ordering of the kinds and quantities of goods in production.
The market mechanism, that is to say, does not replace planning by firms but, by influencing
the plans they make, regulates the pattern of production throughout the economy. The
process by which it does so is sequential or evolutionary1, change being brought about
gradually through the interaction of successive decisions taken independently. Spontaneous,
evolutionary coordination and planned, intra-firm coordination are alternatives only to a
limited extent. Evolutionary adjustment cannot bring about concurrent coordination, and
irreducible uncertainty limits the scope of the planning which does.
Evolutionary versus Concurrent Coordination
2. According to Ronald Coase, "The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm
would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism". 2 Although this
proposition has proved exceedingly influential, having given rise to a school of thought
prominent in the analysis of industrial structures, it seems to me misleading. It cannot mean
that a costless price mechanism would enable us to dispense with purposeful activity; it can
only mean, presumably, that, in the absence of transactions costs, purposeful activity would
be required only from inter-trading individuals, there being no need for organised
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 I use the word evolutionary, in its non- scientific, non-Darwinian
sense, to describe an evolving process which takes place gradually
through successive incremental adjustments, no reference to mutation
or selection being implied.
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 R.H. Coase; The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4 1937, pp 386-405.
2cooperation between them such as takes place within firms. But this proposition, I hope to
show, is false.
3. Transformation, like baking a cake, can be carried out through a planned series of
operations, on the basis of appropriate knowledge, by one person. But for more complex
operations, several people have to cooperate. They must have appropriate knowledge and
their activities must be so fitted together as to conform to an appropriate plan. The activities,
in other words, have to be subject to coordination which is both concurrent and continuous.
Activities can sometimes be coordinated by sequential adjustments, each new activity
justifying itself, in profit terms, in relation to activities which are already being undertaken
or can safely be assumed to be about to be undertaken. But we have only to think of the set
of activities that take place, for example, within a factory, to appreciate that the required
pattern of relationship cannot always be brought about this way. In that context, the rationale
of any one activity depends upon a whole set of activities, of which it is a member, being
undertaken at the same time. There has to be a design, and organised cooperation  is
required to provide the concurrent coordination needed to bring activities in correspondence
with it. Such coordination, as well as being concurrent,  also has to be continuous. In the
production of goods, it is not enough to put a set of activities into an appropriate mutual
relationship and expect it to remain appropriate. The actions of those engaged in organised
cooperation have continuously to adapt to changing circumstances and in a coordinated
fashion.  I shall have more to say later about the nature of this organised cooperation, my
immediate purpose being to mark the difference between coordination which can come
about gradually, as the unintended consequence of independent decision -taking, and
coordination which, having to be concurrent and continuous, requires planning. The supply
of cars, for example, can, in favourable circumstances, come spontaneously into line with
the demand for them, as the consequence of decisions taken independently, in the hope of
profit and subject to no over-arching plan. And the supply of components for car production
can likewise come into spontaneous adjustment. In the manufacture of these components,
however, and their assembly into cars, continous, concurrent coordination, and therefore
organised cooperation, is required.
3The Process of Concurrent Coordination
4. Some concurrent coordination can be brought about by cooperative arrangements other
than those which define a firm.  Two or more individuals can concurrently coordinate their
activities simply  through mutual undertakings, each commiting himself appropriately in
advance. And firms can coordinate their activities by means of what I have described in an
earlier article as a "dense network of cooperation and affiliation".3 But if the number of
cooperating individuals is large, and the required coordination is continuous and complex,
cooperation has to be arranged as in a firm, through a set of characteristic contracts, of the
kind discussed by Ronald Coase and subsequently. These contracts provide, among other
things, for the division, beween cooperating parties, of the revenue from their joint activity;
this important function of the firm is much discussed in the literature and I shall not be
concerned further with it here. Related to this is the need to align, through rewards and
penalties, the personal interests of the cooperating parties with the aims of the organisation. I
shall not be concerned with this issue also, not because it is unimportant, but in order to
concentrate on other matters, perhaps  more fundamental. Even if there were no conflict
between the interests of the parties concerned, their activities would still have to be
coordinated in accordance with a conscious design. And this need could only be met by
setting up a firm,  conscious design being a distinct management function exercised, not
only by the board of directors, but at different levels throughout the organisation,
hierarchically.
5. Concurrent coordination can sometimes be brought about, I have observed, by
cooperation other than that organised as in a firm. This does not mean, however, that it is
produced by "the price mechanism". The important distinction, it seems to me, is between
planned coordination achieved through cooperation, whether or not organised in a firm, and
unplanned coordination that comes about spontaneously as the indirect and unintended
consequence of actions taken independently. In the 1972 article I earlier referred to, I
describe the "orchestration of development, manufacture and marketing [which] takes place
without any shareholdings by Marks and Spencer in its suppliers and without even long-term
contracts". Planned coordination can be effected, in appropriate circumstances, through
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4cooperation between, rather than within firms, but it is wrong to associate it with the
spontaneous, unplanned coordination resulting from independent market transactions. It is
for this reason that I find Coase's distinction between "firm" and "the price mechanism" to
be so misleading. Marks and Spencer plan and achieve the coordination of activities that are
not grouped as in a firm, but the credit for doing so is due to its management rather than to
"markets", "the price mechanism" or "the invisible hand".
6.  Those engaged in cooperation have particular functions, these being related to the
knowledge they possess4. They will require professional knowledge, or technical skill, of
one kind or another, but if their cooperation is to be effective, they must also possess what,
for want of a better term, one may call local knowledge, knowledge, that is, of those with
whom they have to deal and of the rules and roles of the organisation. Coordination between
the activities of different people cannot be obtained by telling each of them precisely what to
do, but will depend on how they inter-act with fellow-members of their team, in accordance
with prescribed roles and rules, in response to changing and unforeseen circumstances. For
this reason, the effectiveness of a firm depends not only on the professional and technical
knowledge and skills of its members, but also on the local knowledge which they have
gained from working with each other. The effectiveness of a firm, in other words, depends,
in part, on the way in which those working for it are inter-related, and therefore on the
quality of its organisation. The stability of the relationships in place is of obvious
importance from this point of view; a computer programmer, a salesmen, an accountant, or
an editor may be on the payroll of a firm, or may be assigned to it by another firm paid to
provide a particular, specialised service, or may work free-lance, perhaps on a commission
basis. According to the terms of the relevant contract, he may, or may not, "belong" to the
firm, but the formal position may be less important to his effectiveness than the degree of
stability and commitment characterising his relationships with those with whom he has to
cooperate.  For this reason, the firm, in operational terms, need not be coincident with the
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 My own thinking about economic organisation has been profoundly affected by Hayek's observation that the
knowledge available to a society was dispersed among many minds, markets being a means by which it is
harnessed. People specialise, he pointed out, on activities they know about, and then sell their product on the
open market for money, which they can use to buy from those who specialise on other activities. But Hayek
does not say much about how the dispersion of knowledge is also harnessed by the organised cooperation,
within firms, of those who possess it. Nor does he have much to say about the division of labour between
these two different ways of harnessing knowledge. This is the issue which, in this paper, I seek to address.
Hayek's analysis is in his paper, Economics and Knowledge, Economica 1937.
5particular network of contracts which formally define it. Members of a firm, through
working for it for a period, come to provide a service which, by virtue of that experience, is
in some degree specialised, and no longer completely equivalent to a service that which
could be bought in the open market. The value of this specialisation will, of course, differ
according to the function concerned, being less in the provision of, say, catering or cleaning
services than in the case of those engaged in the core activities of production. One should
also recognise that there is an optimum degree of stability in the relationships within an
organisation; procedures must not harden into fixed routine, a change of jobs may provide
re-juvenation, and organisations can gain from the transfusion of new blood. Without some
degree of stability, however, organised cooperation would not work.
7. A firm, like a nation state, but to a much lesser degree, is organic in character, and our
understanding of it is impoverished by exclusive concentration on the contracts with which
it is associated. It has a life of its own, to the extent that it embodies and passes on traditions
independent of its transient membership. And by virtue of the knowledge, skills and
experience of its membership, of the character of its organisation, and of its external
connections and reputation, a firm becomes possessed of particular capabilities, defined in
terms of the kinds of business in which it is engaged and of the other kinds of business in
which it would have a comparative advantage over firms generally. Organised cooperation is
required, I have argued, in order to bring about the concurrent coordination required to
produce goods, but by effecting coordination in particular contexts, a firm acquires
experience which can be applied in other contexts. I have said that firms are required in
order to provide concurrent coordination, but such coordination is not commonly necessary
in relation to the entirety of the activities which it undertakes. Thus the need for concurrent
coordination, which gives the firm its essential rationale, will not explain, at any time, the
full range of its activities. The justification for combining activities may reside, not in their
complementarity, or vertical relationship in a process of production, but in their similarity,
in the sense that they require, or have  been believed to require, the same capabilities for
their successful undertaking. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that we should not expect
to find a current logical justification for the pattern of business which a firm may, at any
particular time, be engaged in. A firm's range of activities may reflect the industrial logic of
a former time, and may persist after the logic no longer holds, just as animals may retain
characteristics which no longer provide, as previously, a selective advantage - or may retain
6them, at any rate, for so long as no positive competitive disadvantage is suffered. Oxford
University Press has exhibited, over the centuries, mutations of this kind; at one time, it was
believed expedient to seek to subject the activities of publishing, printing and paper making
to concurrent coordination, despite their great dissimilarity. OUP itself printed the books
which it published, on paper from its own mill and with ink made in-house. By the middle
of this century, the links between these stages of production became increasingly tenuous,
coordination was gradually abandoned, and both printing and paper making were run as
distinct businesses selling in the open market. But this dispensation did not last; it became
apparent that the way ahead was in expansion in publishing, along the line of the central
capability, and in the abandoment of the related, but very dissimilar, activities of printing
and paper making.
8. The process of transformation therefore,  if it is at all complex, is undertaken by a
tolerably stable cooperating group, possessing, collectively, particular capabilities, there
having been created a framework of roles and roles calculated to ensure that cooperation
will produce the designed result.  The question then arises as to what particular stages in the
process of transformation the firm will undertake. If we have in mind a model of the process
of transformation according to which a firm converts some original "factors of production"
directly into final consumer goods. then the issue does not arise. In reality, of course, the
manufacture of any good, whether it be a shirt or a submarine, involves innumerable stages
of transformation, all of which no one firm could ever conceivably itself undertake. And, of
course, these stages are inter-related in a complex manner; the production of a shirt does not
come about through a linear series of stages of transformation in, each of which being
peculiar to that series. On the  contrary, any one process of transformation, such as the
manufacture of chemicals to dye the shirt, is likely to be a stage in a countless number of
quite different processes of production. So complex is the inter-linking, indeed, that it would
scarcely be possible to specify all the processses of transformation that enter into what we
call the "production" of any particular consumer good.
The Process of Evolutionary Coordination
9. Transformation itself is carried out, as we have seen, by the planned and purposeful
activity that takes place within firms. The complex inter-linkage throughout the economy of
7different stages of transformation develops either spontaneously through market
transactions, or through inter-firm cooperation. Linkage is facilitated by the emergence of
intermediate goods, through the separating out, that is to say, of particular stages in the
process of production, so as to make available goods suitable for use in other stages of
production.5 If these intermediate goods are in general demand, they are produced "for the
market", without the security offered by long-term contracts, but if they made specifically
for one particular purpose, then inter-firm cooperation is required.
10. I have distinguished between concurrent coordination, which is brought about through
intra-firm or inter-firm cooperation, and evolutionary coordination, which spontaneously
links different stages of production. I have already expressed my dissatisfaction with the
distinction, made by Coase and others, between coordination, within the firm, by "the
entrepreneur", and coordination, through market transactions, by means of "the price
mechanism". By putting the matter is this way, the impression is created, first, that prices
have no role to play the process of coordination that takes place within firms and, secondly,
that they in themselves are sufficient to bring about coordination outside them. The first
proposition is misleading. No one disputes that planned coordination within a firm takes
account of the prices at which inputs are purchased and outputs sold. Beyond that, however,
and in order to make rational use of those intermediate goods and services which the firm
itself both produces and uses, it is possible to establish departmental "profit centres" which
inter-trade at notional transfer prices set either by agreement between them, or by those to
whom they are responsible, or in accordance with corresponding prices on open markets.
The second proposition, that prices can by themselves effect coordination, is also
misleading. It suggests that current prices coordinate economic activity by providing firms
with clear and sufficient signals about what production decisions they should take. 6 But the
prevailing prices for a good are relevant to such  decisions only to the extent that they
provide a useful indication of what prices will be when the good is produced and comes to
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Competition and Increasing Returns", in Essays on Adam Smith, edited by Andrew Skinner and Thomas
Wilson, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975.
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Roberts, Prentice Hall International 1992, p.27.
8be sold, and this they will do only if there is reason to believe that the circumstances
affecting prices are not likely greatly to change. For the signalling provided by prices to
work, that is to say, it is necessary to have that stability or continuity in the relevant
economic environment which, we observed earlier, was a condition necessary for
incremental or evolutionary adjustment. The distinction between coordination within a firm,
and coordination through market transactions, has to do not with whether prices have a role
to play in the process, but with whether the coordination required has to be concurrent or
can proceed on an incremental or evolutionary basis.
The Role of Prices
11. It is, of course, possible to claim that prices do contain all the information on which to
base production decisions, provided they are understood to relate not only to goods currently
available, but also to goods available at future dates or according to different "states of the
world"; thus we have prices for "jam -today", "jam tomorrow",  "umbrellas- when -it - is -
raining", "umbrellas- when - it - is - sunny" and so on. But although a construction of this
kind may save the neo-classical model,7 it is, for the most part, an evasion. It is hard to see
how firms could know the prices at which they can expect to sell goods at a future date,
other than by having entered into  contracts with buyers; the coordination of their plans in
this case would however been then have been achieved, effectively,  through cooperation
rather than spot market transactions. Prices by themselves can only be made to appear able
to coordinate activities, in such a case, through failure to disclose the planning that has to go
on behind the scenes. Neither concurrent or evolutionary coordination will develop
rationally without the mediation of market prices; these prices, however, do not represent a
signalling mechanism sufficient in itself to promote the coordination of related activities
and, by featuring them as such, the need for either cooperation or continuity is obscured.
12. Markets enable us, as pointed out by Hayek and others, to exploit the knowledge which
is uncertain and dispersed among many minds. But so do firms, in a quite different way. The
division of labour, to put it differently, is practised both among businesses and within them;
the required subsequent integration is achieved, in the former case, through market
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 Op. Cit. p.68.
9transactions, and, in the latter, through organised cooperation. Organised cooperation
reduces uncertainty by arranging that each activity within a set of complementary activities
will be appropriately matched, most simply, by an exchange of promises between two
people, or, in a more complex context, by cooperation within a firm according to a
prescribed design. Markets reduce uncertainty in an entirely different manner, which
depends on the stability which aggregates may be expected to have in appropriate
circumstances. Typically, the producer of a consumer good relies, not on promises to buy
from individual customers, but on their future aggregate demand being sufficiently
predictable. Similarly, a firm that decides to purchase a required input on the market, rather
than produce it itself, relies on the aggregate future supply of that input being sufficiently
predictable. There is no attempt to foresee, or secure through contracting, purchases or
offers from single buyers or sellers, reliance being put on the predictability of the aggregate
demand and supply of goods which are bought and sold by many people. Trading in these
goods, in competitive markets, establishes prices which, by influencing the plans of firms
and consumers, modulate production throughout the economy, not only in terms of the
quantities being produced of goods currently available, but in terms also of the structure of
structure of production, as characterised by the degree of specialisation and the consequent
variety of intermediate goods.
13. Each of us can endeavour to reduce uncertainty about what other people will do by
exchanging undertakings with them, but only at the price of reducing also the freedom of
manoeuvre with which we hope to cope with uncertainty of a more general kind. The scope
for planned coordination is limited by this circumstance, at the point where the balance of
advantage tips towards relying on the stability of aggregates, upon which the prospect of
successful spot transactions necessarily depends. Neither procedure can free us from the
possibility of surprises, but we need both of them in order to negotiate an uncertain world.
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